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to open financial   
arteries show some signs 
of success.
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The current recession has deepened because of shrinking credit flows 
from banks, nonbank lenders and securities markets. This contrasts with the 
early 1990s, when new bonds and commercial paper cushioned a bank credit 
crunch, and with the high-tech investment bust of the early 2000s, when 
steady bank lending lessened the impact of receding bond and equity finance 
markets. 
This time, breakdowns in key credit markets posed great risks to the 
financial system and the broader economy. The Federal reserve responded with 
unprecedented measures, expanding its role as lender of last resort in an effort 
to unclog credit markets and free up the financial flows vital to a well-function-
ing economy.1  EconomicLetter  Federal reserve Bank oF dallas 2   Federal reserve Bank oF dallas  EconomicLetter
An apt metaphor is the cardio-
vascular system, which sustains the 
human body. In like fashion, financial 
flows provide critical sustenance to the 
economy, channeling funds to borrow-
ers and payments back to lenders. In 
both biology and finance, blockages 
are unhealthy. Indeed, the financial 
system’s seizing up in the last quarter 
of 2008 triggered the sharpest decline 
in domestic economic growth since the 
credit crunch of 1980. 
The U.S. financial system is com-
plex, but three channels dominate the 
flow of money from savers and inves-
tors to borrowers. First, the traditional 
banking system raises funds from 
depositors, then lends to borrowers 
(Chart 1, top section). Second is secu-
rities-funded lending, which can take 
two forms. Lenders can make loans 
and sell them as securities. Or they can 
hold the loans in portfolio and fund 
them by issuing debt in the securities 
market (middle). Third, well-known 
and highly regarded companies are 
able to directly finance their needs by 
issuing debt in the securities markets 
(bottom).
Normally, these channels effi-
ciently move funds from savers and 
investors to borrowers at interest rates 
that reflect underlying risks and rea-
sonable profit expectations. In the 
current crisis, each channel has been 
blocked due to many financial institu-
tions’ weak condition and investors’ 
and lenders’ extreme aversion to risk. 
The result has been a significant chok-
ing off of economic activity.2
Clearing the blockages has 
become critical to restoring the econo-
my’s health. A rebound will take time, 
but the good news is that several ini-
tiatives have helped parts of the finan-
cial system stabilize, a necessary step 
on the road to recovery. 
Support for Bank Lending
The interbank loan market arose 
to allow banks with unfunded invest-
ment opportunities to borrow at very 
low interest rates from banks with 
excess deposits. Ready access to addi-
tional funds gave banks more confi-
dence about making loans. 
Until summer 2007, this market’s 
benchmark London interbank offered 
rate, or Libor, typically ran a tenth of 
a percentage point above the risk-
less rate expected over the life of the 
loan—the overnight indexed swap, or 
OIS, rate. The spread started widen-
ing after several European investment 
funds halted redemptions on Aug. 14, 
2007, because they couldn’t price parts 
of their portfolios invested in securities 
backed by subprime mortgages and 
other risky assets. This event set off a 
crisis of confidence among banks, and 
just a month later—in mid-Septem-
ber—Libor–OIS spreads were nearly 1 
percent.
Uncertainty about asset values 
led to a general rise in the demand 
for liquidity. Institutions hung on to 
extra liquidity to meet their own fund-
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ing needs. And they feared lending 
to institutions whose default risk had 
risen because of exposure to subprime 
mortgages and other suddenly suspect 
assets.
Because banks could no longer 
count on Libor borrowing to fund 
excess loan demand, they tightened 
credit standards and terms for non-
bank customers. The Federal Reserve’s 
quarterly Senior Loan Officer Opinion 
Survey asks roughly 60 large banks 
how their credit standards changed in 
the past three months. In April 2007, 
a sizable percentage of banks had 
begun tightening criteria on subprime 
and commercial mortgages, but only 
a small share had raised standards for 
non-real estate loans (Table 1). 
By October 2007, roughly two 
months after the Libor-spread spike, 
banks were tightening on all major 
types of loans. A year later, net tight-
ening rose in all loan classes following 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers, a 
major investment bank. 
In effect, the mechanism that 
pumped funds between lending and 
borrowing banks had become partly 
blocked. The Fed looked for ways 
around the blockage. In early fall 2007, 
it extended terms and lowered costs 
on banks’ borrowing from its primary 
credit facility—the discount window. 
However, these steps did little to 
restore lending because banks feared 
borrowing from the Fed might create 
the perception that they were on the 
verge of failing. 
So the Fed acted again. In addi-
tion to further lowering costs for dis-
count window borrowing, it created 
the term auction facility (TAF), which 
allows banks to anonymously bid on 
collateralized long-term loans (Chart 
2). This can be likened to inserting a 
stent that partially reopened Libor’s 
arteries. 
To an extent, the move succeeded 
in quashing the stigma of borrow-
ing from the Fed, and Libor spreads 
narrowed—but not enough.3 They 
remained elevated through the first 
eight months of 2008, a span that 
Table 1
Banks Tighten Credit Standards
Net percentage tightening 
credit standards 





  Oct. 
  2008
   Jan. 
   2009
Real
estate
Prime mortgages 15% 41% 70% 47%
Subprime mortgages 56% 56% 100% 56%
Commercial real estate 30% 50% 87% 79%
Business
Business loans 
(large/medium firms)  –4% 19% 84% 64%
Business loans 
(small firms) 2% 10% 75% 69%
Consumer Consumer loans 
(non-credit card) 8% 26% 64% 58%
SOURCE: Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey, Federal Reserve Board. 
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included the Fed and Treasury funding 
that facilitated the March 2008 sale of 
Bear Stearns, a key Wall Street invest-
ment bank.
A major reason the TAF didn’t ful-
ly unwind Libor spreads was the rise 
of counterparty risk—the possibility 
that the other party to a financial con-
tract would be unable to keep its end 
of the bargain. Banks were leery of 
lending to each other out of fear that 
counterparty risk would materialize. In 
fall 2008, Libor spreads spiked largely 
because it was unclear how much 
counterparty risk other companies 
faced as a result of Lehman Brothers’ 
collapse—or similar events that might 
follow (Chart 3).
After Lehman’s failure, Libor 
spreads didn’t start receding until two 
key events arguably lowered coun-
terparty risk. The first was partial 
payment on Oct. 10, 2008, of credit 
default swap insurance the investment 
bank had provided on many securities. 
The Lehman settlement helped lower 
counterparty risk by clarifying many 
firms’ exposure and reducing uncer-
tainty about financial firms’ ability to 
absorb losses.
The second was the announce-
ment the next day that the Group of 
Seven (G-7) nations would recapital-
ize their banking systems and increase 
liquidity facilities to back up banks. 
The G-7 actions gave banks additional 
support against systemic surges in 
liquidity demand.
These efforts partially repaired the 
damage that loan losses and uncertain-
ty have done to the banking system’s 
ability to pump credit to borrowers. By 
bolstering banks’ equity cushions, the 
limited recapitalization has helped low-
er counterparty risk, providing some 
relief to the banking system. 
In the early months of 2009, Libor 
spreads have been far below their 
early-October highs but remain nearly 
a percentage point above their long-
term averages. The persistent wide 
spread likely reflects continuing con-
cerns about banks’ current and future 
health and the recognition that further 
action will be needed to clean up the 
financial system.
As Libor spreads narrowed, the 
Fed’s loan officer survey began show-
ing a parallel development—an ebb 
in tightening of credit standards. (See 
Table 1 on p. 3.) It was slight, to 
be sure. The months leading up to 
January still showed considerable cau-
tion among lenders. It probably reflect-
ed the combination of a poor econom-
ic outlook, the compromised condition 
of many banks and new write-downs 
of bad loans and investments. Because 
of banks’ critical role in the overall 
credit markets, the Treasury is devel-
oping additional plans to reduce stress 
on the system.
Credit Funded by Securities
The Federal Reserve Act empow-
ers the central bank to make col-
lateralized loans to banks as a way 
to prevent solvent institutions from 
failing due to a lack of liquidity. In 
1932, Congress expanded the Fed’s 
authority to act under extreme circum-
stances, allowing collateralized lending 
to nonbanks to help support financial 
markets. 
Chart 3
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Until recently, the Fed had used 
this power only during the Great 
Depression. It didn’t invoke this 
authority in the wake of the 1987 stock 
market crash or the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001. Instead, the Fed 
did what it usually did: provided banks 
with discount loans to support their 
lending to securities dealers and other 
borrowers. 
Neither event halted a finan-
cial boom that was closely linked to 
strength in a few sectors of the econ-
omy. This time, a financial boom did 
come to an end, and it was directly 
related to the financing of homebuild-
ing and housing-backed consumer bor-
rowing—major drivers of the recovery 
from the 2001 recession. 
It’s against this backdrop that the 
Fed has extended its role as lender of 
last resort beyond banks. Since late 
2007, the central bank has supported 
key credit flows funded by securi-
ties, extending loans on nonfinancial 
corporations’ commercial paper, resi-
dential mortgage-backed securities and 
nonbank financial companies’ loans to 
consumers and businesses.4 
The Fed actions recognize the dra-
matic shift toward debt funded through 
securities markets. At the end of 1979, 
securities funded about 33 percent of 
household, nonfinancial corporate and 
nonfarm business debt. By the third 
quarter of 2008, that figure had risen 
to around 64 percent (Chart 4A). 
A closer look reveals that house-
hold debt became significantly more 
dependent on market funding, largely 
reflecting the increased importance of 
asset-backed securities (ABS) in fund-
ing mortgages and consumer loans. 
Even the share of nonfinancial cor-
porate debt funded by securities rose 
considerably over the same period—
from 57 percent to 76 percent (Chart 
4B).5
Much of this increase reflects 
the growing importance of corporate 
bonds, securities-funded lending and 
commercial mortgage-backed securi-
ties. Securities-funded lending became 
more important even for small busi-
nesses, rising from 6.5 percent of 
credit at year-end 1979 to nearly 23 
percent by third quarter 2008.  
The increased importance of 
nonbank credit makes maintaining 
liquidity in these markets critical for 
financing overall economic activity. 
Recognizing this reality, the Fed has 
provided liquidity beyond the tradi-
tional commercial banking sector. 
Chart 4
Funding of Nonfinancial Sector Debt
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Support for commercial paper. 
Commercial paper serves as an impor-
tant source of funding for large non-
financial corporations and securities-
funded lenders. Money market mutual 
funds purchase much of this short-term 
debt, raising funds by issuing shares 
to investors. These funds are invested 
in Treasury bills and highly rated com-
mercial paper, so investors generally 
think of them as free of risk from 
default or fluctuating interest rates. As 
a result, ample funds were available to 
borrowers at relatively low cost.
In August 2007, the spread 
between interest rates on commercial 
paper and Treasury bills widened 
because of the demand for liquidity 
and concerns about risk. The spreads 
stayed relatively high through the next 
year and spiked following Lehman 
Brothers’ failure. Compounding the 
situation was an unusual event at a 
money market fund facing defaults on 
its Lehman Brothers commercial paper 
investments. Those losses were so 
large that the fund closed and paid its 
investors below the $1 a share par val-
ue—breaking the buck, as it’s called.
This event prompted many insti-
tutional investors to redeem shares at 
money market funds invested in com-
mercial paper. To raise cash to meet 
the withdrawals, the funds sold their 
holdings of paper into a thin mar-
ket, pushing commercial paper rate 
spreads to extremely high levels. The 
run could have accelerated had many 
households also fled the market. 
To prevent a commercial paper 
breakdown, initial policy efforts 
focused on supporting liquidity in 
money market mutual funds. For 
example, the Fed encouraged bank 
use of the discount window to finance 
loans to money funds facing redemp-
tions. In addition, the Treasury extend-
ed deposit insurance to the funds to 
allay investor concern about possible 
losses if other funds broke the buck. 
These actions were designed to act 
like stents in opening the arteries into 
and out of money market funds (Chart 
5A). 
Are Expanded Lender of Last Resort Actions Inflationary?
Recent actions to add liquidity in key credit markets have meant rapid growth in the 
Federal Reserve System’s balance sheet. On March 18, 2009, the Fed held $236 billion 
in residential mortgage-backed securities and $241 billion in commercial paper. In addi-
tion, the central bank has the option to expand holdings in mortgage-backed securities to 
$1.25 trillion and invest up to $1 trillion in the newly created term asset-backed securities 
loan facility, or TALF. 
Viewed as a conventional monetary policy action, this large potential increase in 
reserves might raise concerns over future inflation. But the Fed’s extraordinary lending 
facilities were created to address a temporary liquidity crisis, with the intention of undo-
ing asset purchases and excess reserve creation as the financial crisis and the need for 
extra liquidity abate.
In a financial crisis, investors flee riskier investments, bringing a sharp rise in the 
demand for safe, liquid assets—most broadly, money.
At the micro level, depositors’ withdrawing funds from solvent banks creates liquid-
ity pressures that might force the banks to call-in loans or even shut down. The classic 
role for a central bank in a financial crisis focuses on this problem by providing liquidity 
to solvent banks against good collateral at an interest rate above some benchmark safe 
asset. Such lending enables solvent but illiquid institutions to survive until the panic 
fades and the discount loans are unwound.
At a macro level, a surge in safe-harbor demand for money would push up short-
term interest rates—unless it’s offset by a large enough increase in the money supply. 
Temporary creation of reserves can enable the money supply to expand in line with 
demand during the panic, helping avoid interest rate increases that could damage the 
economy.  
As the crisis ebbs, fewer discount loans are needed, and the supply of reserves can 
be shrunk to match the falling demand for money as a safe harbor. In this way, solvent 
institutions, the financial system and the overall economy can be cushioned without fuel-
ing inflationary pressures, while enabling the market system to shutter insolvent firms.
In a modern financial system, securities-funded lending has replaced the banking 
system as the predominant credit source for households and nonfinancial firms. Because 
of this development, it can be appropriate to extend the lender of last resort role to tem-
porarily support some nonbank credit sources.
During a crisis, for example, the Fed could make collateralized loans against top-
quality residential mortgage-backed securities and commercial paper to facilitate the 
financial flows to creditworthy borrowers. For two reasons, such actions needn’t be 
inflationary.
First, if banks are too reluctant to lend, the reserves created during the crisis could 
induce a surge in excess reserves. This would largely fund central bank asset purchases 
and not spur the multiple deposit creation that would fuel rapid growth in the broad 
money supply. In addition, excess reserves created in this process largely prevent a spike 
in liquidity demand from pushing up short-term interest rates to highly rated borrowers. 
So far, both of these patterns hold in the current crisis.
Second and more important, when the financial crisis recedes, purchased assets 
could be sold and the temporary reserves could be withdrawn in the interest of long-run 
price and financial stability. 
Note
The classic case for central banks as lender of last resort can be found in Henry Thornton’s 
An Enquiry into the Nature and Effects of Paper Credit of Great Britain (1802) and Walter 
Bagehot’s Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market (1873).  EconomicLetter  Federal reserve Bank oF dallas   Federal reserve Bank oF dallas  EconomicLetter 7
Unfortunately, risk aversion 
among investors—including many 
company treasurers who deposit 
assets in money funds—surged fol-
lowing Lehman Brothers’ collapse. As 
a result, liquidity premiums jumped, 
leading to a sharp widening of the 
spread between commercial paper and 
Treasury bill interest rates. Investors’ 
extreme risk aversion made it almost 
impossible for even many highly 
regarded companies to continue issu-
ing new commercial paper, and the 
amount of commercial paper outstand-
ing fell sharply.
More action was needed. The 
Fed’s next step was to allow money 
market mutual funds to directly bor-
row collateralized discount loans from 
a new money market investor funding 
facility. This helped prevent a flood of 
money-fund redemptions that would 
have set off a disorderly sale of com-
mercial paper in an already unsettled 
market. 
Investors were still uncertain 
whether companies would be able 
to issue new paper to repay matur-
ing debt, especially if other investors 
should become too risk averse. To 
address this, the Fed announced it 
would fund purchases of top-rated 
commercial paper via a new facility 
capitalized by the Treasury—the com-
mercial paper funding facility (CPFF). 
The Treasury raises funds by issuing 
new bonds, and the Fed uses the 
Treasury’s deposits and some excess 
bank reserves to help meet the com-
mercial paper needs of solid compa-
nies (Chart 5B). 
This facility has acted as a partial, 
temporary bypass, relieving block-
age in the securities markets. Since 
October 2008, commercial paper lend-
ing has revived, and spreads between 
commercial paper and comparable-
maturity Treasury bills have narrowed 
(Chart 6). Steps to bolster liquidity in 
related markets also contributed to the 
improved functioning of the commer-
cial paper market. 
It’s been less daunting to restore 
more normal conditions in top-grade 
commercial paper than in the Libor 
market. Investors perceive that top-
rated issuing companies have a lower, 
more transparent default risk than 
many financial institutions. 
Support for prime-mortgage 
lending. At one time, banks and 
thrifts originated and held most home 
mortgages, funding the loans with 
deposits. The development of mort-
gage securitization in recent decades 
launched a new era, and the market 
grew rapidly. 
Lenders could originate mortgages 
that met certain credit and underwrit-
ing standards and sell them to Fannie 
Mae or Freddie Mac. The two govern-
ment-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) 
would then package the mortgages 
into mortgage-backed securities. In 
exchange for a fee, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac passed through payments 
Chart 5
Action to Revive the Commercial Paper Market
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from mortgage borrowers to investors 
and guaranteed the underlying mort-
gages against default.
Because the two GSEs were per-
ceived as implicitly backed by the fed-
eral government, investors viewed the 
mortgage-backed securities as largely 
free from default risk and even good 
substitutes for Treasury bonds. By 
2000, this securitization channel fund-
ed a majority of household mortgages.
In late 2006, mounting loan losses 
stemming from the housing crisis were 
depleting capital reserves at Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac. At the time, the 
two agencies guaranteed $4.5 trillion 
in mortgage-backed securities, only 
a small fraction of which involved 
nonprime mortgages. However, 
their federal charters and oversight 
also led the two GSEs to invest in 
privately issued nonprime mortgage-
backed securities, primarily to meet 
the public policy goal of expanding 
homeownership.
Growing mortgage problems 
hurt Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac by 
lowering the value of these nonprime 
mortgage-backed securities invest-
ments. The two GSEs sustained further 
damage from defaults on the prime, or 
conforming, mortgages for which they 
had indemnified investors. 
These prime-mortgage losses 
demonstrate the impact of the boom 
and bust of nonprime lending on 
home prices.6 By 2006, nearly 40 per-
cent of home purchases financed with 
securitized mortgages involved the 
use of subprime or other nonprime 
loans.7 By increasing the homeowner-
ship rate, this lending boom helped 
push up housing prices—at least for 
a while. 
Inevitably, the poor underwriting 
standards for many nonprime mort-
gages gave way to staggering losses. 
A confluence of factors began pushing 
housing prices down in late 2006:
• Easy lending practices had con-
centrated purchases in the early part of 
the decade, accelerating the timing of 
demand from buyers who would have 
otherwise waited a few years; 
• the 2007 pullback in nonprime 
lending reduced the demand from 
potential buyers who no longer quali-
fied for mortgages; and
• rising foreclosures flooded an 
already oversupplied housing market.
Chart 6
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Declining home prices and excess 
supply increased the likelihood of 
prime-mortgage borrowers default-
ing. Falling collateral values, in turn, 
added to losses on loans guaranteed 
by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
As mortgage troubles rose, the two 
GSEs found it difficult to raise new 
money to meet minimum capital 
requirements.
Growing concerns about their 
viability led investors to demand high-
er interest rates on GSE-guaranteed 
mortgage-backed securities relative to 
Treasury rates, which remained low 
because of investors’ strong preference 
for holding Treasuries, the most liquid 
securities. 
Typically, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac can pass higher risk 
spreads to loan originators. For this 
reason, mortgage interest rates didn’t 
drop in early 2008 despite large 
declines in Treasury interest rates and 
the Fed’s federal funds rate target. 
This widening of liquidity spreads had 
important implications beyond mort-
gage markets because GSE securities 
had been used as collateral in repur-
chase, or repo, agreements and other 
financial arrangements.
Among the critical financial sys-
tem arteries are primary dealers, which 
buy initial public offerings of mort-
gage-backed securities and later sell 
these securities from their portfolios. 
Dealers must be confident they can 
access liquidity from their mortgage-
backed securities holdings through 
repo agreements. Otherwise, they’d 
have little incentive to make a mar-
ket in newly issued mortgage-backed 
securities, and much mortgage financ-
ing would evaporate as a result. 
To keep this artery open, the 
Fed created the term securities lend-
ing facility in March 2008. It allows 
primary dealers to temporarily borrow 
Treasury securities from the central 
bank, putting up GSE debt as collater-
al. Making mortgage-backed securities 
more liquid helped Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac to continue issuing debt 
in the primary security markets, which 
supported the continued funding of 
prime mortgages (Chart 7).
Unfortunately, the housing mar-
ket continued to worsen, dragging 
down home values and pushing up 
mortgage losses. Doubts about the 
liquidity of prime-mortgage securities 
intensified, and the benchmark interest 
rate on 30-year, conforming, fixed-rate 
mortgages rose in mid-2008. Treasury 
interest rates were falling at the time 
due to Fed monetary policy actions 
and a faltering economy’s weakening 
credit demand.
With more losses looming for 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and dis-
ruptions to the prime-mortgage market 
mounting, the Treasury responded in 
July by announcing plans to put the 
two GSEs into conservatorship and 
giving explicit assurances to back 
Chart 7
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their guarantees on mortgage-backed 
securities. These actions helped sta-
bilize spreads between mortgage-
backed securities and Treasury bond 
interest rates at high levels, but they 
didn’t trigger a return to more normal 
spreads.
With very ill patients, alleviating 
one ailment sometimes doesn’t ensure 
a full recovery. When the demand for 
liquidity spiked after Lehman Brothers’ 
collapse, spreads between mortgage-
backed securities and Treasury yields 
widened, preventing mortgage rates 
from falling despite sharp declines in 
the 10-year Treasury yield (Chart 8). 
Stubborn mortgage rates undermined 
conventional monetary policy’s ability 
to cushion the economic downturn by 
influencing interest rates on private 
debt. 
To counteract this, the Fed initially 
committed to purchasing up to $500 
billion in GSE mortgage-backed secu-
rities and up to $100 billion in GSE 
debt, which provide the organizations 
with funding to package the securities 
and hold them. This announcement 
led to a sharp narrowing in mortgage-
backed securities–Treasury spreads. 
The decline in interest rates 
on mortgage-backed securities was 
largely, but not completely, transmitted 
into lower interest rates on traditional 
30-year, fixed-rate mortgages. The gap 
between these two rates is normally 
about 0.1 percentage point, reflecting 
securitization and servicing fees from 
borrowers to mortgage-backed securi-
ties investors.
In early 2009, that gap widened 
to about 0.5 percentage point, per-
haps partly due to increased fees. 
Nevertheless, the average rate on 
30-year, fixed-rate conforming mort-
gages has fallen by nearly 1 full per-
centage point since the Fed announced 
its program.  
To provide even more support to 
mortgage markets, the Fed announced 
plans in mid-March to buy as much 
as another $750 billion in GSE 
mortgage-backed securities, bringing 
potential holdings up to $1.25 trillion 
this year. The central bank also said 
it would double its purchase of GSE 
debt, bringing that total to up to $200 
billion.  
Support for consumer and 
small business lending. Many con-
sumer and business loans are bundled 
and issued as asset-backed securities. 
After the surge in liquidity premiums 
across a wide spectrum of financial 
instruments, market conditions turned 
extremely inhospitable to new ABS 
issues. 
Finding it difficult to obtain funds, 
many lenders severely tightened 
credit standards. This lack of funding, 
coupled with the inability of many 
capital-constrained banks to hold 
loans, has led to a broad credit crunch 
for small businesses and consumers. 
For example, the freezing up of fund-
ing reduced the number of potential 
car buyers, exacerbating the decline in 
vehicle sales. 
To help these borrowers, the Fed 
announced it would make heavily col-
lateralized loans to certain holders of 
Aaa-rated consumer and government-
guaranteed small business loans. By 
promoting liquidity in this market, the 
The decline in interest rates 
on mortgage-backed 
securities was largely, but not 
completely, transmitted into 
lower interest rates 
on traditional 30-year 
fixed-rate mortgages.
Chart 8
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term asset-backed securities loan facil-
ity, or TALF, is intended to facilitate 
more normal interest rate spreads for 
consumer- and business-loan-backed 
securities and thereby help alleviate 
the credit crunch.
An important goal is to improve 
market funding for these loans, much 
as the Fed’s mortgage-backed securities 
purchases sought to enhance mortgage 
market conditions. Since the November 
announcement, the potential size 
of this facility—which launched in 
March—has been increased from $200 
billion to $1 trillion.
Restoring Financial Health
Because a financial boom had 
a major role in the run-up in home 
prices and growth in consumption 
since 2000, the ensuing financial bust 
and crisis has hit the U.S. economy 
especially hard. Indeed, the cur-
rent recession has deepened as the 
financial crisis has curtailed the criti-
cal flow of credit to households and 
businesses. 
Faced with the worst financial 
crisis since the Great Depression, the 
Fed hasn’t restricted itself to the con-
ventional monetary policy response of 
lowering the overnight federal funds 
rate. Rather, it has extended its role as 
a lender of last resort to stabilize both 
the financial system and the overall 
economy. Providing unconventional 
liquidity has helped the central bank 
engineer policy for a modern credit 
market that has been transformed from 
a bank-dominated system funded by 
deposits to one predominantly funded 
by securities markets. 
What’s made policy challenges 
even more daunting has been severe 
blockages in all three main arteries 
through which credit flows to house-
holds and businesses. To support 
the needed flow of finance until the 
banking system returns to normal and 
the rhythm of the securities markets 
becomes more regular, the Fed is pro-
viding stents and bypasses to open 
some bank and nonbank financial 
arteries. 
The central bank is also acting as 
a temporary heart and lung machine 
while the main valves of the finan-
cial system undergo major surgery to 
excise the bad assets from the balance 
sheets of many banks and financial 
institutions. The partial resumption 
of financial flows in the commercial 
paper and mortgage-backed securi-
ties markets indicates these efforts are 
having some success. And by helping 
sustain credit flows financed by securi-
ties, the Fed is indirectly providing fis-
cal authorities with time to restore the 
banking system’s health. 
At some point, a further pickup 
of financial flows, coupled with stimu-
lus from monetary and fiscal policy, 
will spur economic recovery. When 
financial markets require less help, the 
Fed’s unusual discount lending will be 
unwound to prevent inflationary pres-
sures from building. 
Because economic swings often 
lag financial developments and policy 
actions, the U.S. economy will likely 
continue to contract well into 2009. 
Nevertheless, one key to bringing 
about an eventual economic recovery 
has been the modernization of the 
central bank’s role as a lender of last 
resort to meet the needs of today’s 
global and immensely complex finan-
cial system. 
Duca is a vice president and senior policy advisor, 
DiMartino is a financial analyst, and Renier is 
a research analyst at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Dallas.
Notes
The authors thank Niki Maas for research sup-
port.
1 More information on the Fed’s credit and liquid-
ity programs is available at www.federalreserve.
gov/monetarypolicy/bst.htm. The Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York has posted a table summariz-
ing the central bank’s actions at www. 
newyorkfed.org/markets/Forms_of_Fed_Lending.
pdf and provides details on these steps at www.
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/recentactions.
htm.
2 “From Complacency to Crisis: Financial Risk 
Taking in the Early 21st Century,” by Danielle 
Faced with the worst 
financial crisis since 
the Great Depression, 
the Fed has extended its 
role as a lender of last 
resort to stabilize both 
the financial system and 
the overall economy.EconomicLetter  is  published  monthly 
by  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Dallas.  The  views 
expressed are those of the authors and should not be 
attributed to the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the 
Federal Reserve System.
  Articles may be reprinted on the condition that 
the source is credited and a copy is provided to the 
Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Dallas.
  Economic  Letter  is  available  free  of  charge 
by  writing  the  Public  Affairs  Department,  Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas, P.O. Box 655906, Dallas, TX 
75265-5906; by fax at 214-922-5268; or by telephone 
at 214-922-5254. This publication is available on the 
Dallas Fed website, www.dallasfed.org.
Richard W. Fisher
President and Chief Executive Officer
Helen E. Holcomb
First Vice President and Chief Operating Officer
Harvey Rosenblum
Executive Vice President and Director of Research
W. Michael Cox
Senior Vice President and Chief Economist
Robert D. Hankins










Federal reserve Bank oF dallas
2200 n. Pearl st.
dallas, tX 75201
DiMartino, John V. Duca and Harvey Rosenblum, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Letter, 
no. 12, December 2007.
3 See “The Federal Reserve’s Term Auction 
Facility,” by Olivier Armantier, Sandra Krieger and 
James McAndrews, Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York Current Issues in Economics and Finance, 
vol. 14, no. 5, July 2008; “On the Effectiveness of 
the Federal Reserve’s New Liquidity Facilities,” by 
Tao Wu, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Working 
Paper no. 0808, May 2008; and “A Black Swan 
in the Money Market,” by John B. Taylor and 
John C. Williams, American Economic Journal: 
Macroeconomics, vol. 1, no. 1, January 2009, 
pp. 58–83.
4 With the federal funds rate at about zero, Feder-
al Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke described the 
general approach of providing liquidity support 
to banks and nonbanks as “credit easing” in a 
Jan. 13, 2009, speech, “The Crisis and the Policy 
Response,” www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/bernanke20090113a.htm. For why the 
Bank of England has supported credit from non-
bank sources, see Governor Mervyn King’s Jan. 
20, 2009, speech at www.bankofengland.co.uk/
publications/speeches/2009/speech372.pdf. The 
general case for acting in nonbank markets is dis-
cussed in “The World’s Central Banks Must Buy 
Assets,” by John Muellbauer, Financial Times, 
Nov. 24, 2008, www.ft.com/cms/s/0/28f8faac-
ba3e-11dd-92c9-0000779fd18c.html.
5 Figures are based on flow of funds data on 
the consumer credit and mortgage debt of 
households and nonprofits and the credit market 
debt of nonfinancial corporations and nonfarm, 
noncorporate business. Non-securities-funded 
debt includes credit extended by banks (plus 
savings and loans) and by some nonbank inter-
mediaries that use contractual obligations to fund 
investments (for example, insurance companies 
using accumulated premiums to directly make 
commercial mortgages—exclusive of purchasing 
commercial mortgage-backed securities, which 
is a form of securities-funded credit). Securities-
funded debt includes securitized mortgages 
and other asset-backed instruments, corporate 
bonds, commercial paper, finance company loans 
and securities-funded commercial mortgages. 
The last item equals commercial mortgages 
financed by commercial mortgage-backed securi-
ties, asset-backed securities, finance companies, 
government agencies and real estate investment 
trusts. 
      The authors apportioned commercial mort-
gage debt using the total non-securities-funded 
share of commercial mortgages multiplied by 
commercial mortgages in each sector. Details 
on business “other loans” are used to apportion 
funding from securities markets and nonsecurity 
intermediaries. These figures understate the 
market sensitivity of debt as banks have become 
more dependent on nondeposit funding and 
derivatives to reduce risk. 
6 For more information, see “The Rise and Fall 
of Subprime Mortgages,” by Danielle DiMartino 
and John V. Duca, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 
Economic Letter, no. 11, November 2007.
7 “Mortgage Quality du Jour: Underestimated No 
More,” Credit Suisse, March 13, 2007.